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Department: Department of Algebra
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Hash functions play an important role in cryptography. They have applications
in digital signatures, password verification and other forms of authentication.
Therefore, it is important that they have all the desired properties and cannot
be easily attacked.
A (cryptographic) hash function is a function mapping binary strings of arbi-
trary length to fixed-length binary strings called hash values. The input string is
often called a message. For practical purposes, we want the function to be com-
putationally efficient. Furthemore, it is desirable that a hash function behaves
randomly. That means that a small change in the input message results in a big
change in the corresponding hash value. It should be also difficult to find two
messages with the same hash value, or, when given a message, to find a different
message with the same hash value.
Many hash functions, including some of the widely used ones as SHA-1 or
MD5, are built in the form of the Merkle-Damg̊ard construction [8, 1]. It means
that the input message is divided into blocks of the same length, and these blocks
are successively processed by a compression function. In this thesis we also call
these hash fuctions iterated hash functions. However, many of iterated hash func-
tions have been “broken”; there have been found attacks on them with complexity
lower than we would expect of an ideal hash function. Naturally, the question
arises as to whether it is possible to modify the Merkle-Damg̊ard construction to
prevent these attacks. We could, for example, compress the blocks of the input
message in different order or use some of them more then once. Then we need to
know whether such a generalisation improves the security significantly.
In this thesis, we study generalised iterated hash functions. Our work is based
on [5] and [6], where the authors described a multicollision attack on generalised
iterated hash fuctions. In the following chapter, we introduce basic terminology of
words and languages as well as basics of partial orders on words. We also describe
the birthday paradox. In the second chapter, we state the formal definition of a
generalised iterated hash function. We also mention some earlier results concern-
ing hash functions and collisions. Chapter 3 contains our main results; we prove
that certain regularities in long words are unavoidable, and we reduce the bound
from [6]. Finally, in the fourth chapter, we describe the relation between the com-
binatorial results and a multicollision attack on so-called q-bounded generalised
iterated hash functions, thus proving that they are not secure.
2
1. Terminology and basics
In this chapter, we introduce basics of words, languages and partial orders. As
will be shown later, they are closely related to hash functions. For the sake of
convenience, we use the same terminology as in [5]. We also describe the birthday
paradox which is used quite often when studying hash functions.
1.1 Words and languages
We denote the set of all positive integers by N+ and the set of all natural numbers
by N, i.e. N = N+ ∪ {0}. For each l ∈ N+ we define Nl = {1, 2, . . . , l}.
An alphabet is a finite, nonempty set of elements called symbols or letters.
A word over an alphabet is a finite sequence of symbols from the alphabet. There-
fore, assuming we have a word w over an alphabet A, we can write w = x1x2 · · · xn,
where n is a nonnegative integer and xi ∈ A for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. The integer
n is called the length of w and denoted |w|. If n is equal to zero, then we call
w the empty word, which is often denoted by ϵ. Let A∗ (resp. A+) be the set
of all words (resp. all nonempty words) over A. Similarly, we define a∗ (resp.
a+) as the set of all words (resp. all nonempty words) over the alphabet {a}.
By |w|a we understand the number of occurences of the letter a in w. The al-
phabet of w is defined as alph(w) = {a ∈ A
∣∣ |w|a > 0}. Let a ∈ alph(w) and
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |w|a}. Then we denote the i-th occurence of the symbol a in the
word w by aw,i. We say that v = v1v2 · · · vm, where v1, v2, . . . , vm ∈ A∗, is a
subword of w if w = x0v0x1 · · · vmxm for some x0, x1, . . . , xm ∈ A∗. We call a
subword v of w a factor of w if w = x0vx1, where x0, x1 ∈ A∗. We say that words
w1, w2, . . . , wm form a factorisation of the word w if w = w1w2 · · ·wm.
Let A and B be alphabets. A mapping h : A∗ → B∗ is a morphism if h(uv) =
h(u)h(v) for all u, v ∈ A∗. If B ⊆ A, then the projection morphism from A∗
into B∗, denoted by πAB (or πB, when A is clear from the context), is defined
by πAB(b) = b for each b ∈ B and πAB(a) = ϵ for each A \ B. We also define
(w)B = ϵ if πB(w) = ϵ and (w)B = a1a2 · · · as if πB(w) = a+1 a+2 · · · a+s , where
s ∈ N+, a1, a2, . . . , as ∈ B and ai ̸= ai+1 for i = 1, 2, . . . , s− 1.
A word w over an alphabet A is a permutation of A if |w|a = 1 for each a ∈ A.
A language over the alphabet A is an arbitrary subset L ⊆ A∗.
1.2 Partial orders on words
Let (X,≺) be a partially ordered set. The elements x, y ∈ X, x ̸= y are incom-
parable if neither x ≺ y nor y ≺ x holds. The elements x1, x2, . . . , xn ∈ X form
a chain in (X,≺) if xi ≺ xi+1 for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n− 1}. The length of a chain
is equal to the number of elements forming the chain. We denote the length of a
chain c by |c|. A chain decomposition of (X,≺) is a set of chains {ci}i∈I such that
{Ci}i∈I is a partition of X, where Ci = {x ∈ X |x occurs in ci}. Now suppose
that X is finite. We call the cardinality of the largest set Y ⊆ X consisting of
pairwise incomparable elements the maximum number of incomparable elements
(of (X,≺)). The minimum chain decomposition size of (X,≺) is the smallest
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positive integer m such that there exist chains c1, c2, . . . , cm in (X,≺) for which
{ci}mi=1 is a chain decomposition of (X,≺). We also define the maximum chain
length of (X,≺) as the greatest positive integer m such that there exists a chain
of legth m in (X,≺).
Now we can introduce a partial order on symbols in a word. Let α be a
nonempty word. We define the binary relation ≺α on alph(α) as follows. For
each a, b ∈ alph(α), a ≺α b holds if and only if a ̸= b and all occurences of a in α
lie before the first occurence of b in α. Quite obviously, ≺α forms a partial order
on alph(α). We call some elements independent (with respect to ≺α) if they form
a chain in (alph(α),≺α).
The following famous theorem of Dilworth [2] gives a connection between the
number of incomparable elements and the minimum chain decomposition size.
Theorem 1. Let (X,≺) be a finite partially ordered set. Then the maximum
number of incomparable elements of (X,≺) is equal to the minimum chain de-
composition size of (X,≺).
We can apply Dilworth´s theorem on words and derive the following useful
lemma (see Lemma 4.8. in [5]). We repeat the proof for the sake of completeness.
Lemma 1. Let m and n be positive integers and α a word such that alph(α) ≥
m · n. Then either (i) the maximum chain length of (alph(α),≺α) is at least m;
or (ii) the maximum number of pairwise incomparable elements in (alph(α),≺α)
is greater than n.
Proof. Suppose that the maximum chain length in (alph(α),≺α), denoted by
d, is less than m. Let t be the minimum number of chains needed to cover
(alph(α),≺α). Obviously
m · n ≤ |alph(α)| ≤ d · t.
Since d < m, we have t > n. By Dilworth´s theorem the maximum number of
pairwise incomparable elements of (alph(α),≺α) is equal to t.
1.3 Birthday paradox
The birthday paradox or also birthday problem is a basic concept needed to
understand collisions in hash functions. Suppose we have a set of n elements. We
pick k elements uniformly at random (we can pick one element more times). What
is the probability p that we pick one element at least twice? Another formulation
of this problem could be as follows. What is the probability that among k people
there are at least two with the same birthday? In this formulation, we have
n = 365. We shall discuss the general case. Obviously, the probability is equal
to one for k > n. Thus, we can restrict ourselves to the case k ≤ n. Firstly, we
calculate the probality p̄ that all our picks are different. We have

















Since 1 + x ≤ ex for each real number x, we get
p̄ ≤ e0 · e−
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Our probability p is equal to p = 1− p̄. Say we want p to be at least 0.5. In other










k(k − 1) ≥ 2n log 2
k2 − k − 2n log 2 ≥ 0.










Therefore, we need to pick only about
√
n elements to get at least one twice.
Intuitively, most of the people would expect that k needs to be about n
2
. Applying
our result to the case n = 365, the lower bound on k is approximately 23. Thus,
among 23 people there are at least two sharing their birthday with the probability
over 0.5. This is the reason why this problem is called the birthday paradox.
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2. Hash functions
In this chapter, we describe hash functions and their generalisations using a nota-
tion consistent with [5]. Some earlier ideas on hash functions and multicollisions
can be also found in [3, 4, 9].
2.1 Basic definitions and notation
When working with iterated hash functions, we suppose that the original message
is given in a block representation form, i.e. the message is divided, and if necessary
padded, into blocks of equal size. We also assume that all our messages are over
the binary alphabet {0, 1}.
Definition 1. A hash function of length n (where n ∈ N+) is a mapping f :
{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n.
By a preimage of a given hash value y we understand x ∈ {0, 1}∗ such that
f(x) = y. Let x be a given messsage. A second preimage of y = f(x) is x′ ∈
{0, 1}∗, x′ ̸= x such that f(x′) = y. Let k be a positive integer. A k-collision in
f is a set A ⊆ {0, 1}∗ satisfying |A| = k and f(x) = f(y) for all x, y ∈ A. We
often call a 2-collision simply a collision in f .
An ideal hash function is a variable input length random oracle, which means
that for each x ∈ {0, 1}∗, the value f(x) ∈ {0, 1}n is chosen uniformly at random.
For an ideal hash function f , we need, on average, to hash O(2n) messages to
find a preimage or a second preimage. To find a k-collision with a probability






messages. This follows from the generalised birthday paradox, for details see [10].
Hash functions are often constructed iteratively. In the following, we describe
an iterated hash function and its generalisation.
Definition 2. A compression function (of block sizem and lenght n) is a mapping
f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}m → {0, 1}n, where m > n are positive integers.
An ideal compression function is also a random oracle, in this case a so-called
fixed input length random oracle.
For a compression function f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}m → {0, 1}n, we define the
function f+ : {0, 1}n × ({0, 1}m)+ → {0, 1}n inductively as follows. Let h ∈
{0, 1}n, y1 ∈ {0, 1}m, and y2 ∈ ({0, 1}m)+. Then f+(h, y1) = f(h, y1) and
f+(h, y1y2) = f
+(f(h, y1), y2). Note that f
+(h, y y′) = f+(f+(h, y), y′) for all
y, y′ ∈ ({0, 1}m)+.
Let u be a word in ({0, 1}m)+. Then we can write u = u1u2 · · ·ul, where
l ∈ N+ and ui ∈ {0, 1}m for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l}. Define the morphism ū :
N∗l → {0, 1}∗ by ū(i) = ui for each i ∈ Nl. Suppose α ∈ N+l is given. It can be
expressed as α = i1i2 · · · is, where s ∈ N+ and ij ∈ Nl for j = 1, 2, . . . , s. Then
ū(α) = ui1ui2 · · · uis . Obviously ū(α) is a word containing blocks from u in the
order and multiple determined by α.
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Now we can define the iterated compression function fα : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}ml →
{0, 1}n based on α and f by fα(h, u) = f+(h, ū(α)) for each h ∈ {0, 1}n and u ∈
{0, 1}ml. It is quite straightforward to see that for α = α1α2, where α1, α2 ∈ N+l ,
and for all h ∈ {0, 1}n and u ∈ {0, 1}ml the following equalities hold:
fα(h, u) = f
+(h, ū(α)) = f+(h, ū(α1)ū(α2)) =
= f+(f+(h, ū(α1)), ū(α2)) = fα2(fα1(h, u), u).
We say that a set A ⊆ {0, 1}ml is a k-collision in fα with the initial value h0, where
k ∈ N+ and h0 ∈ {0, 1}m, if |A| = k and fα(h0, u) = fα(h0, v) for all u, v ∈ A.
The k-collision A is called nontrivial if, for each u = u1u2 · · ·ul and v = v1v2 · · · vl
in A such that ui, vi ∈ {0, 1}m for i = 1, 2, . . . , l, the equality uj = vj holds for
each j ∈ Nl \ alph(α).
Definition 3. Let αj ∈ N+j and alph(αj) = Nj for each j ∈ N+. Denote α̂ =
(α1, α2, . . .). Then we define the generalised iterated hash function
Hα̂,f : {0, 1}n × ({0, 1}m)+ → {0, 1}n
based on α̂ and f as follows: for the initial value h0 ∈ {0, 1}n and the message x
consisting of j blocks (of the lentgh m) let Hα̂,f (h0, x) = fαj(h0, x).
Remark 1. A traditional iterated hash function H : ({0, 1}m)+ → {0, 1}n based
on f (with the initial value h0 ∈ {0, 1}n) is defined by H(u) = f+(h0, u) for
all u ∈ ({0, 1}m)+. This definition is equivalent to a generalised iterated hash
function Hα̂,f : {0, 1}n × ({0, 1}m)+ → {0, 1}n where α̂ = (1, 1 · 2, 1 · 2 · 3, . . .) and
the initial value is fixed as h0.
We say that a set A ⊆ ({0, 1}m)+ is a k-collision in Hα̂,f with the initial value
h0, where k ∈ N+ and h0 ∈ {0, 1}m, if |A| = k and for all u, v ∈ A, |u| = |v| and
Hα̂,f (h0, u) = Hα̂,f (h0, v).
When constructing our attack, we assume that the attacker knows α̂ and
thus knows in which order Hα̂,f compresses the blocks. On the other hand, the
compression function f is a black box, i.e. the attacker does not know its internal
structure and can only make queries on f and get responses.
2.2 Earlier results
In [4] Antoine Joux shows a multicollision attack on traditional iterated hash
fuctions. For each k ∈ N+ he can find a 2k-collision with the complexity O(k ·2
n
2 ).
The idea of the attack is quite simple yet efficient. Let H : ({0, 1}m)+ → {0, 1}n
be the given traditional iterated hash function based on the compression function
f and h0 be the initial value. It follows from the birthday paradox that, by
hashing approximately 2
n
2 messages, we can find a message set {u11, u12} such that
f(h0, u11) = f(h0, u12) = h1. Similarly we find {u21, u22} such that f(h1, u21) =
f(h1, u22) = h2. We can continue this process until we find {uk1, uk2} such that
f(hk−1, uk1) = f(hk−1, uk2) = hk. The total number of queries on f is O(k ·2
n
2 ). It
is obvious that the set {u1i1u1i2 · · ·ukik | ij = 1, 2, j = 1, 2, . . . , k} is a 2k-collision
in H.
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In [9] Nandi and Stinson present a 2k-collision attack on an iterated com-
pression function fα, where f : {0, 1}n × ({0, 1}m)+ → {0, 1}n and α satisfies
the following conditions: (i) alph(α) is large enough and (ii) |α|a ≤ 2 for each
a ∈ alph(α). The complexity of their attack is
O(k2 · ln r · (n+ ln(ln 2r)) · 2
n
2 ).
In [3] Hoch and Shamir study generalised iterated hash functions. They show
that for a function Hα̂,f , where |αi|j ≤ q, i ∈ N+, j ∈ Ni and q is a fixed
positive integer, there exists a multicollision attack. For a given k ∈ N+, a
2k-collision in Hα̂,f can be constructed with the complexity O(p(n, k)2
n
2 ), where
p(n, k) is a polynomial. Similar results are obtained in [5]. In [6] the authors study
regularities in long words with bounded number of symbol occurences which leads
to reducing the complexity of the attack from [5]. In this thesis, we continue with
their study and reduce the complexity even more.
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3. Main combinatorial results
3.1 Regularities in long words
In this chapter, we focus on combinatorial properties of long words. It follows from
the definition of generalised iterated hash functions that finding some regularities
in long words can lead to a (multi-)collision attack. This attack is thoroughly
explained in [5] and is also described in the following chapter.
Definition 4. Let m and q be positive integers. Then we define N(m, q) as the
smallest integer such that for every word α, where |alph(α)| ≥ N(m, q) and |α|a ≤
q for each a ∈ alph(α), there exists A ⊆ alph(α) which satisfies: |A| ≥ m and
there exists p ∈ {1, 2, . . . , q} and words α1, α2, . . . , αp such that α = α1α2 · · ·αp
and the word (αi)A is a permutation of A for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p}.
The existence of such an integer for every m and q was proved in [6]. It was
shown there that N(m, q+1) ≤ N(m2 −m+1, q) for all positive integers m and
q. Obviously N(m, 1) = m. Therefore N(m, q) ≤ m2q−1 .
The main goal of this thesis is to investigate the optimality of the upper bound
on N(m, q) presented in [6] and to improve the bound in cases where it is not
perfect. Obviously N(1, q) = 1 for every positive integer q, which is exactly the
value given in [6]. The following remark (see Remark 1. in [6]) treats the case
q = 2.
Remark 2. Let m ∈ N+ and let
B = {ai,j|i = 1, 2, . . . ,m− 1, j = 1, 2, . . . ,m}
be an alphabet of m(m− 1) symbols. Let furthemore
γi = ai,1ai,2 · · · ai,m−1ai,mai,m−1ai,m−2 · · · ai,1
for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m − 1 and α = γ1γ2 · · · γm−1. It is quite obvious that there
does not exist an m-letter subalphabet A ⊆ B such that either (i) (α)A is a
permutation of A or (ii) there exists a factorisation α = α1α2 such that (α1)A
and (α2)A are both permutations of A.
Therefore N(m, 2) = m2 −m + 1, so the bound in [6] is optimal also in the
case q = 2.
Before we focus on the other cases, we introduce the following useful remark.
Remark 3. Suppose positive integers m and q are given, and we want to fac-
torise a word α as in Definition 4. Thus we need to find a subalphabet A ⊆
alph(α), |A| ≥ m and a factorisation of α into at most q factors αi such that
(αi)A is a permutation of A for each i. Let B be a subalphabet of alph(α) and
denote β = πB(α). Suppose there exists A
′ ⊆ B ⊆ alph(α) of cardinality at
least m as well as words β1, . . . , βp, p ≤ q, such that β = β1 · · · βp and for all
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p}, the word (βi)A′ is a permutation of A′. Define A = A′. Then
obviously, we can factorise the word α into α = α1α2 · · ·αp so that βi is a subword
of αi for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p}. Evidently, the word αi is a permutation of A for all
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p}.
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We shall now focus on the case m = 2.
Theorem 2. Let q be a positive integer. Then N(2, q) ≤ q + 1.
Proof. Let α be a word satisfying |alph(α)| ≥ q + 1 and |α|a ≤ q for each a ∈
alph(α). Then there exist two symbols, denote them a1 and a2, such that |α|a1 =
|α|a2 . Let A = {a1, a2} and β = πA(α). Without loss of generality we may assume
that the word β starts with the symbol a1. Therefore we have either








1 · · · a
β,i2
















1 · · · a
β,i2




1 · · · a
β,ik
1 .
In other words, β consists of blocks of the symbols a1 and a2 starting with a1.
Denote i0 = 0, j0 = 0. In the first case, we can define
βn = a
β,in−1+1




2 · · · a
β,jn
2
for all n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k}. Then, evidently, β = β1β2 · · · βk, where k ≤ q since
|β|a1 = |β|a2 ≤ q. Moreover (βn)A = a1a2 is a permutation of A for all n ∈
{1, 2, . . . , k} and we are done.
In the second case, we denote by l the greatest positive integer such that
jl−1 + 1 < jl. Such l must exist because |β|a1 = |β|a2 and hence there is a block
with at least two occurences of a2. Then we can define
βn = a
β,in−1+1




2 · · · a
β,jn
2 for n ∈ {1, . . . , l − 1},
βl = a
β,il−1+1




















1 · · · a
β,in
1 for n ∈ {l + 2, . . . , k}.
We get β = β1β2 · · · βk, where (βn)A = a1a2 for n ∈ {1, . . . , l} and (βn)A = a2a1
for n ∈ {l + 1, . . . , k}. We can factorise the word β and therefore, according to
Remark 3, we can also factorise the word α.
Theorem 2 gives us an upper bound on N(2, q). The following remark shows
that the bound is sharp.
Remark 4. Let {a1, a2, . . . , aq} be a set of q symbols and
α = aqaq−1 · · · a1aqaq−1 · · · a2 · · · aqaq−1aq .
Let A = {ai, aj} be an arbitrary two-element subset of alph(α) and suppose i > j.
Then πA(α) = aiajai · · · aja+i and it is quite straightforward to see that the word
α cannot be factorised as in Definition 4. Therefore we get N(2, q) = q + 1.
The following theorem deals with the case q = 3.
Theorem 3. Let m be a positive integer. Then N(m, 3) ≤ 2m3 −m2 +m.
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Proof. Let α be a word such that |alph(α)| ≥ 2m3 − m2 + m and |α|a ≤ 3 for
each a ∈ alph(α). Since |alph(α)| ≥ m · (2m2 −m+ 1), Lemma 1 gives us these
two possibilities:
(i) there exists a chain of length at leastm in (alph(α),≺α). Then we can define A
as the set of the elements of this chain. For this A, the word (α)A is a permutation
of A and we are done.
(ii) the maximum number of pairwise incomparable elements in (alph(α),≺α) is
greater than 2m2−m+1. Denote by B the maximum set of pairwise incomparable
symbols. We get |B| ≥ 2m2 − m + 2. We define Bi = {a ∈ B | |α|a = i} for
i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Then evidently |B1| ≤ 1, otherwise there would be two symbols in
B1, denote them a and b such that a ≺α b or b ≺α a, but we suppose that all
symbols in B are pairwise incomparable.
Suppose now that |B2| ≥ m. Let β = πB2(α) and factorise the word β = β1β2
in the following way: we define β1 as the shortest word containing all symbols
from B2 at least once. In other words, β1 = b1 · · · bk, |β1|bk = 1 and |β1|b ≥ 1 for
all b ∈ B2. Then |β1|b = 1 for all b ∈ B2, otherwise we would get a symbol bj such
that |β1|bj = 2 and therefore bj ≺β bk, which yields bj ≺α bk, a clear contradiction
with supposed incomparability of bj and bk. Hence we may define A = B2 and
the words (β1)A and (β2)A are permutations of A. It follows from Remark 3 that
we can factorise the word α and we are finished.
The remaining case is |B2| ≤ m− 1 from which follows |B3| ≥ 2m2 − 2m+ 2,
because |B1| ≤ 1. Denote γ = πB3(α). We factorise the word γ in a similar way
as the word β in the previous paragraph, i.e. γ = γ1γ2 where γ1 is the shortest
word containing all symbols from B3 at least once. So γ1 = c1 · · · cl, |γ1|cl = 1
and |γ1|c ≥ 1 for all c ∈ B3. From the incomparability of the symbols it follows
that |γ1|c ≤ 2 for all c ∈ B3. Therefore, we have either |γ1|c = 2, |γ2|c = 1,
or |γ1|c = 1, |γ2|c = 2 for all c ∈ B3. Denote X = {c ∈ B3 | |γ1|c = 2}
and Y = {c ∈ B3 | |γ2|c = 2}. Let z =max{|X|, |Y |}. Then z ≥ |B3|/2 =
m2 − m + 1. Suppose z = |X|, the case z = |Y | can be treated analogically.
Denote δ = πX(γ). Then δ = δ1δ2, where δ1 = πX(γ1) and δ2 = πX(γ2). Since
|alph(δ1)| = |X| ≥ m2−m+1 = N(m, 2), there exists a set A ⊆ alph(δ1), |A| ≥ m,
positive integer p ∈ {1, 2} and words δ1,1, . . . , δ1,p such that δ1 = δ1,1 · · · δ1,p
and (δ1,i)A is a permutation of A for all i ∈ {1, . . . , p}. Clearly, (δ2)A is also a
permutation of A and therefore we can factorise the word δ as δ = δ1δ2, where
(δ1)A, (δ2)A are permutations of A, or δ = δ1,1δ1,2δ2, where (δ1,1)A, (δ1,2)A and
(δ2)A are permutations of A. It follows from Remark 3 that we can also factorise
the word α.
For the general case, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Let m and q be positive integers, q > 1. Then






[N(N(m, i), q − i)− 1]
+N(m, q − 1)
 .
Proof. Let α be a word such that






[N(N(m, i), q − i)− 1]
+N(m, q − 1)

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and |α|a ≤ q for each a ∈ alph(α). Lemma 1 gives us these two possibilities:
(i) there exists a chain of length at leastm in (alph(α),≺α). Then we can define A
as the set of the elements of this chain. For this A, the word (α)A is a permutation
of A and we are done.






[N(N(m, i), q − i)− 1]
+N(m, q − 1) + 1
pairwise incomparable elements in (alph(α),≺α). Denote by B the maximum set
of pairwise incomparable symbols and define Bq−1 = {a ∈ B | |α|a ≤ q − 1},
Bq = {a ∈ B | |α|a = q}. If |Bq−1| ≥ N(m, q−1) there exists A ⊆ alph(β), where
β is defined as β = πBq−1(α), such that |A| ≥ m and we can factorise the word β
as in Definition 4. Then, according to Remark 3, we can also factorise the word
α.
If |Bq−1| < N(m, q − 1) we have





[N(N(m, i), q − i)− 1] + 1
 .
Denote γ = πBq(α). We factorise the word γ into γ = γ1γ2 where γ1 is the
shortest word containing all symbols from Bq at least once. So γ1 = c1 · · · cl,
|γ1|cl = 1 and |γ1|c ≥ 1 for all c ∈ Bq. It follows from the incomparability of the
symbols that |γ1|c ≤ q − 1 for all c ∈ Bq. Denote X = {c ∈ Bq | |γ1|c ≥ q/2}
and Y = {c ∈ Bq | |γ2|c ≥ q/2}. Let z =max{|X|, |Y |}. Then z ≥ |Bq|/2.
We can assume that z = |X|, the case z = |Y | is analogical. We also define










[N(N(m, i), q − i)− 1] + 1 .
Therefore there exists k ∈ {1, . . . , ⌊q/2⌋} such that |Ck| ≥ N(N(m, k), q − k).










[N(N(m, i), q − i)− 1] .
Let δ1 = πCk(γ1). Then there exists A
′ ⊆ alph(δ1), |A′| ≥ N(m, k), positive
integer p′ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , q−k} and words δ1,1, δ1,2, . . . , δ1,p′ such that δ1 = δ1,1 · · · δ1,p′
and (δ1,j)A′ is a permutation of A
′ for all j ∈ {1, . . . , p′}. Let further ε2 =
πA′(γ2). Since |alph(ε2)| ≥ N(m, k) and for each d ∈ A′ we have |ε2|d ≤ k,
there exists A ⊆ alph(ε2), |A| ≥ m, positive integer p′′ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} and words
ε2,1, ε2,2, . . . , ε2,p′′ such that ε2 = ε2,1 · · · ε2,p′′ and (ε2,j)A is a permutation of A for
all j ∈ {1, . . . , p′′}. If we denote ε1 = πA(δ1) and ε1,l = πA(δ1,l) for l ∈ {1, . . . , p′},
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we get ε1 = ε1,1 · · · ε1,p′ and each of the words (ε1,l)A is a permutation of A. All
in all, we have
πA(α) = ε = ε1ε2 = ε1,1 · · · ε1,p′ε2,1 · · · ε2,p′′ ,
where p′+p′′ ≤ (q−k)+k = q. We can factorise the word ε from which it follows
that we can also factorise the word α.
3.2 Estimate of the upper bound
Theorem 4 gives us an upper bound on N(m, q), but the recursive construction
is rather complicated and, for practical purposes, difficult to evaluate for large q.
Therefore we need an estimate of this bound. Hence we formulate the following
theorem.
Theorem 5. Let c = 2/3 and k = 9/20. Then N(m, q) ≤ m2cq−k for all positive
integers m and q.
Proof. We start with the case q = 1. We want




which obviously holds for all positive m. Similarly, for q = 2 we want




which also holds for all positive integers m. Another trivial case is m = 1, there
we have




For m = 2 we need to prove




We already know, that it holds for q = 1 and q = 2. Since 2
2
3
q−9/20 ≥ 2 23 q−1 ≥ q
for q ≥ 3 and 2q ≥ q + 1 for q ≥ 1, it also holds for q ≥ 3.
Now we shall focus on the case q = 3. For m = 1 and m = 2 it has been
already solved. For other values of m, we shall prove







N(3, 3) ≤ 43 ≤ 3
7
2 ≈ 46.8 .
For m ≥ 4 we have N(m, 3) ≤ 2m3 −m2 +m and thus it remains to be proved
that m7/2 ≥ 2m3 − m2 + m for m ≥ 4. Obviously, 2m3 ≥ 2m3 − m2 + m and
m7/2 = m3 ·
√
m ≥ 2m3 for m ≥ 4.
We proceed by induction on q for q ≥ 4 and m ≥ 3. We have






[N(N(m, i), q − i)− 1]
+N(m, q − 1)
 .
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The induction hypothesis yields

































]+N(m, q − 1)
 ≤





















Note that N(m, q − 1) = N(N(m, 1), q − 1) ≤ M , so we can write N(m, q) ≤
m · (q + 1) ·M .
We need to prove that









for m ≥ 3 and q ≥ 4. Denote






















− k2 − k − 1 ≥ 0
for q ≥ 3, we get P (m + 1, q) ≥ P (m, q) for q ≥ 3 and every positive integer m.
Furthemore


































3 ) ≈ 2.08 .
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Hence, P (m, q+1) ≥ P (m, q) form ≥ 3 and q ≥ 4. We have P (14, 4) ≈ 1.015 > 1,
and thus P (m, q) ≥ 1 for m ≥ 14 and q ≥ 4. Similarly P (5, 5) ≈ 1.31 > 1 and
P (3, 6) ≈ 1.21 > 1, and therefore P (m, q) ≥ 1 also for m ≥ 5 and q ≥ 5 and for
m ≥ 3 and q ≥ 6. We can verify manually that N(m, q) ≤ m2cq−k in the following
cases: q = 4 and m ∈ {3, . . . , 13}, q = 5,m = 3 and q = 5,m = 4. Thus, the
proof is complete.
We can now combine the information about N(m, q). By applying the upper
bound from [6] and the Theorems 2, 3, 4, and 5 we get that N(m, q) satisfies the
following conditions:
N(m, 1) = m,
N(m, 2) = m2 −m+ 1,
N(1, q) = 1,
N(2, q) = q + 1,
N(3, 3) ≤ 43,
N(m, 3) ≤ 2m3 −m2 +m for m ≥ 4,




4. Multicollision attack on hash
functions
In this chapter, we shall describe a multicollision attack on generalised iterated
hash functions. Firstly, we introduce basics of collision attacks on (generalised)
iterated hash functions and also the general schema of our attack. In the second
subchapter, we add a few combinatorial results from [5, 6] and specify the attack.
4.1 General schema of the attack
Suppose a compression function f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}m → {0, 1}n is given. Fur-
thermore, let l ∈ N+ and τ ∈ N+l be a word such that alph(τ) = {t}, i.e. the
alphabet of τ contains only one symbol t ∈ Nl. Let also ω ∈ {0, 1}m be a given
fixed message block.
We want to find a collision in ft with the initial value h ∈ {0, 1}n. We proceed
as follows. Firstly we generate a set R ⊆ {0, 1}m of 2n2 random message blocks.
Then we construct a set S defined by
S = {u1u2 . . . ul | ut ∈ R and ∀i ∈ Nl \ {t} : ui = ω}.
This set contains (at least) two messages with the same hash value with the
probability p̃ ≈ 0.4 (see [7]). By computing ft(h, u) for each u ∈ S we can find
a collision with the probability p̃. This procedure is a so-called basic birthday
attack.
If we want to find a collision with probability equal to one, we can repeat the
basic birthday attack until a collision is found. It is obvious that the expected
number ã of basic birthday attacks needed is equal to 1/p̃ ≈ 2.5. This procedure
is called an extended birthday attack.
Let Hα̂,f be a generalised iterated hash function. An initial value h0 ∈ {0, 1}n
and r ∈ N+ are given and we want to find a 2r-collision inHα̂,f with the initial val-









messages. Our aim is to find an attack with complexity (expected number of
queries) O(p(n, r)2
n
2 ), where p(n, r) is a polynomial. This would prove that gen-
eralised iterated hash functions are not secure, because multicollisions can be
found with less queries than expected of an ideal hash function.
However, the general case, i.e. with no restrictions on Hα̂,f , seems to be very
difficult. Therefere, we shall restrict ourselves to a special case of q-bounded hash
functions. Let q be a positive integer. We say that the sequence α̂ = (α1, α2, . . .)
is q-bounded if |αj|i ≤ q for each j ∈ N+ and i ∈ Nj. We call the hash function
Hα̂,f q-bounded, if α̂ is q-bounded.
The following schema from [5], called nested multicollision attack schema,
generally describes our attack.
Input: A generalised iterated hash function Hα̂,f , an initial value h0 ∈ {0, 1}n
and a positive integer r.
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Output: A 2r-collision in Hα̂,f .
Step 1: Choose (a large) l ∈ N+. Consider the lth element αl of the sequence α̂.
Let αl = i1i2 · · · is, where s ∈ N+ and ij ∈ Nl for j = 1, 2, . . . , s.
Step 2: Fix a (large) set of active indices Act ⊆ Nl.
Step 3: Factorise the word αl into nonempty strings appropriately, i.e. find
p ∈ {1, 2, . . . , s} and βi ∈ N+l such that αl = β1β2 · · · βp.
Step 4: Based upon the active indices, create a large multicollison if fβ1 . More
exactly, find message block sets M1,M2, . . . ,Ml satisfying the following proper-
ties.
(i) If i ∈ Nl \ Act, then the set Mi consists of one constant message block ω.
(ii) If i ∈ Act, then the set Mi consists of two different message blocks mi1 and
mi2.
(iii) The set M = M1M2 · · ·Ml = {u1u2 · · ·ul | ui ∈ Mi, i = 1, 2, . . . , l} is a
2|Act|-collision in fβ1 with initial value h0.
Step 5: Based on the set C1 = M , find message sets C2, C3, . . . , Cp such that
(iv) Cp ⊆ Cp−1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ C1 = M .
(v) For each j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p} the set Cj is a (large) multicollision in fβ1β2···βj
with initial value h0.
(vi) |Cp| = 2r.
Step 6: Output Cp.
Evidently, the set Cp forms a 2
r-collision in Hα̂,f . We shall specify the steps
in the following subchapter.
4.2 Description of the attack
Before we can describe the attack itself, we need to formulate a few more theo-
rems.
Theorem 6. Let k ∈ N+ and A be a finite nonempty set such that k divides
|A|. Furthemore, let {Bi}ki=1 and {Cj}kj=1 be partitions of A such that |Bi| = |Cj|
for i, j = 1, 2, . . . , k. Then for each x ∈ N+ such that |A| ≥ k3 · x, there exists
a bijection σ : {1, 2, . . . , k} → {1, 2, . . . , k} for which |Bi ∩ Cσ(i)| ≥ x for i =
1, 2, . . . , k.
For the proof of the previous theorem see Theorem 4.5 in [5].
Theorem 7. Let d0, d1, . . . , dr, where r ∈ N+, be positive integers such that di
divides di−1 for i = 1, 2, . . . , r, A an alphabet of cardinality |A| = d0d21d22 · · · d2r
and w1, w2, . . . , wr+1 permutations of A. Then there exists a subset B of A of
cardinality |B| = d0 such that the following conditions are satisfied.
(1) For any i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r}, if πB(wi) = x1x2 · · · xdi is the factorisation of
πB(wi) and πB(wi+1) = y1y2 · · · ydi is the factorisation of πB(wi+1) into
di equal length (=
d0
di
) blocks, then for each j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , di}, there exists
j′ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , di} such that alph(xj) = alph(yj′); and
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2 · · · d2r−1dr) blocks, then πB(wr+1) = πB(u1)πB(u2) · · · πB(udr) is the




For the proof of the previous theorem see Theorem 3 in [6].
Theorem 8. Let α be a word and k ≥ 2, n ≥ 1 and q ≥ 2 integers such that
(1) |alph(α)| ≥ N(n(q−1)2k2q−3, q); and
(2) |α|a ≤ q for each a ∈ alph(α).
Then there exists B ⊆ alph(α), an integer p ∈ {1, 2, . . . , q} and a factorisation
α = α1α2 · · ·αp for which
(3) |B| = np−1k;
(4) B ⊆ alph(αi) and the elements of B are independent with respect to ≺αi
for i = 1, 2, . . . , p, i.e. the elements form a chain in (alph(αi),≺αi); and
(5) for any i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p− 1}, if (αi)B = z1z2 · · · znp−ik is the factorisation of
(αi)B into n
p−ik equal length (= ni−1) blocks and (αi+1)B = u1u2 · · · unp−i−1k
is the factorisation of (αi+1)B into n
p−i−1k equal length (= ni) blocks, then
for each j1 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , np−ik} there exists j2 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , np−i−1k} such that
alph(zj1) ⊆ alph(uj2).
The previous theorem follows directly from Theorems 6 and 7; the proof can
also be found in [6]. It is of fundamental importance in our attack schema because
it enables us to factorise the word α in the desired way. Now we have the necessary
combinatorial background to specify the first three steps of the attack.
Input: A q-bounded (q ∈ N, q ≥ 2) generalised iterated hash function Hα̂,f , an
initial value h0 ∈ {0, 1}n and a positive integer r.
Output: A 2r-collision in Hα̂,f .
Step 1: Let l = N(n(q−1)
2
r2q−3, q). Let α = αl where αl is the lth element of the
sequence α̂. Write α in the form αl = i1i2 · · · is, where s ∈ N+ and ij ∈ Nl for
j = 1, 2, . . . , s.
Step 2: Let Act = B, |B| = np−1r, be the set of active indices, where B ⊆ Nl
and p ∈ {1, 2, . . . , q} are as in Theorem 8, when the parameter k = r.
Step 3: Let α = β1β2 · · · βp be the factorisation of α such that the words
β1, β2, . . . , βp have the same properties as the words α1, α2, . . . , αp, respective-
ly, in Theorem 8, when k = r.
The following two lemmata are rather technical and we shall not prove them.
The proofs can be found in [5]. Remember that ã is the expected number of basic
birthday attacks needed to find a collision with probability equal to one.
Lemma 2. Let α be a word over the alphabet Nl, k ∈ N+ and a1, a2, . . . , ak ∈
alph(α) symbols such that a1 ≺α a2 ≺α . . . ≺α ak. Let furthemore α = α1α2 · · ·αk
be a factorisation of α such that for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} all occurences of the
symbol ai in α lie in αi. Given an initial value h0 ∈ {0, 1}n, we can, with
probability equal to one, find message block sets M1,M2, . . . ,Ml ⊆ {0, 1}m as well
as values h1, h2, . . . , hk ∈ {0, 1}n such that
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(1) Mb = {ω} for each b ∈ Nl \ A, where A = {a1, a2, . . . , ak};
(2) Mai = {ui, u′i}, where ui ̸= u′i for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k};
(3) for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} the set M = M1 ·M2 · · ·Ml is a 2-collision in fαi
with initial value hi−1 and a 2
i-collision in fα1α2···αi such that ∀u, u′ ∈ M
hi = fαi(hi−1, u) = fαi(hi−1, u
′) and
fα1α2···αi(h0, u) = fα1α2···αi(h0, u
′).
Moreover, the expected number of queries on f needed to carry out the task is
ã|α|2n2 .
Lemma 3. Let α be a word over the alphabet Nl, d and s positive integers, A ⊆
alph(α) of cardinality |A| = dns, and α = β1β2 · · · βnsγ1γ2 · · · γs a factorisation
of α with the following properties.
(1) A ⊆ alph(β) ∩ alph(γ) where β = β1β2 · · · βns and γ = γ1γ2 · · · γs;
(2) |alph(βi) ∩ A| = d for i = 1, 2, . . . , ns and |alph(γj) ∩ A| = nd for j =
1, 2, . . . , s; and
(3) for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ns} there exists j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , s} such that alph(βi)∩
A ⊆ alph(γj) ∩ A.




2, . . . , uns, u
′
ns ∈ {0, 1}ml be messages and h0, h1, . . . ,
hns ∈ {0, 1}n be values such that for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ns}:
(4) ∀b ∈ Nl \ A : ūi(b) = ū′i(b)
(5) ūi(βi) ̸= ū′i(βi) and hi = fβi(hi−1, ui) = fβi(hi−1, u′i).
Then the set S of all messages u ∈ {0, 1}ml such that for each b ∈ Nl\A : ū(b) = ω
and for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ns} : ū(βi) ∈ {ūi(βi), ū′i(βi)} is well-defined and satis-
fies for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ns} and u ∈ S the equality hi = fβi(hi−1, u). Moreover




2, . . . , vs, v
′
s ∈ S
and values h′0, h
′




0 = hns, such that for each j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , s}
(6) v̄j(γj) ̸= v̄′j(γj) and h′j = fγj(h′j−1, vj) = fγj(h′j−1, v′j).
The expected number of queries on f needed to carry out the task is ã|γ|2n2 .
Finally, the set T of all messages v ∈ {0, 1}ml such that for each b ∈ Nl \ A :
v̄(b) = ω and for each j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , s} : v̄(γj) ∈ {v̄j(γj), v̄′j(γj)} is a well-defined
subset of S and forms a nontrivial 2s-collision in fα with initial value h0.
The following theorem, or rather its proof, describes how to proceed in the
Steps 4 and 5 of our attack.
Theorem 9. Let α be a word over the alphabet Nl, r and p positive integers, A
a subset of the alphabet alph(α) of cardinality |A| = np−1r, and α = α1α2 · · ·αp
a factorisation of α such that for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p}, the elements of A form a
chain in the partially ordered set (alph(α),≺α) (i.e. the elements of A are inde-
pendent with respect to ≺α). Assume furthemore that for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p},
there exists a factorisation αi = αi1αi2 · · ·αi,np−ir of the word αi such that the
following conditions are satisfied.
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(1) |alph(αij) ∩ A| = ni−1 for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p} and j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , np−ir};
and
(2) for every i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p} and every j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , np−ir} there exists k ∈
{1, 2, . . . , np−i−1r} such that alph(αij) ∩ A is a subset of alph(αi+1,k) ∩ A.
Then, given an initial value h0 ∈ {0, 1}n we can, with probability equal to one,
find a nontrivial 2r-collision in fα. Moreover, the expected number of queries on
fα needed to carry out the task is ã|α|2
n
2 .
Remark 5. The previous theorem follows from Lemmata 2 and 3. The com-
plete proof can be found in [5]. Here, we only mention the basic steps of the
construction of the multicollision. We use Lemma 2 to create a 2n
p−1r-collision in
fα1 , which we then extend, by using Lemma 3 repeatedly, to a 2
r-collision in fα.
Firstly, choose the parameters in Lemma 2 as follows: α is equal to α1 and k is
equal to np−1r. Set A = {a1, a2, . . . anp−1r}, where a1 ≺α1 a2 ≺α1 · · · ≺α1 anp−1r.
Then Lemma 2 ensures that we can find, with probability equal to one, a 2n
p−1r-
collision set M in fα1 . Moreover, the expected number of queries on f is ã|α1|2
n
2 .
Denote B1 = M . Choose the parameters in Lemma 3 as follows: Let β
be α1, γ be α2 and s be n
p−2r. Let d be equal 1, βi be equal to α1i for each
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , np−1r} and γj be equal to α2j for each j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , np−2r}. Then
the set S in Lemma 3 is equal to B1. According to the lemma, there exists a
subset T ⊆ S that forms a nontrivial 2np−2r-collision in fα1α2 with the initial value
h0. The expected number of queries on f is ã|α2|2
n
2 . Denote B2 = T .
Similarly, let k ∈ {2, 3, . . . , p− 1} and suppose we have a set Bk, which is a
2n
p−kr-collision in fα1α2···αk with the initial value h0. We apply Lemma 3 with the
parameters set as follows: let β be αk, γ be αk+1 and s be n
p−k−1r. Let d be
equal nk−1, βi be equal to αki for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , np−kr} and γj be equal to
αk+1,j for each j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , np−k−1r}. Then the set S is equal to Bk and we can
find T ⊆ S = Bk forming a 2n
p−k−1r-collision in fα1α2···αk with the initial value h0.
Denote Bk+1 = T . By repeating this process we can find a 2
r-collision in fα with
the initial value h0. The expected number of queries on f is equal to ã|α|2
n
2 .
Therefore we can define the last three steps of the attack as follows:
Step 4: Let M1,M2, . . . ,Ml be as in Lemma 2 where we set A = Act and α is
equal to β1 from Step 3.
Step 5: For each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p} let Ci be equal to Bi from the proof of Theorem
9 (see Remark 5), where α is equal to α = αl, A = Act and p is equal to p from
Step 2.
Step 6: Output Cp.
The following theorem sums up our results.
Theorem 10. Let m,n and q be positive integers such that m > n and q ≥ 2,
f a compression function of block size m and length n, and α̂ = (α1, α2, . . .) a
q-bounded sequence of words such that alph(αi) = Ni for each i ∈ N+. Then, for
each k ∈ N+, there exists a 2k-collision attack on the generalised iterated hash
function Hα̂,f such that the expected number of queries on f is not greater than




Proof. We use our attack schema. In Step 1, we choose α = αl, where l =
N(n(q−1)
2
k2q−3, q). Theorem 9 implies that the complexity of the attack is ã|αl|2
n
2 .





We have found a lower upper bound on N(m, q); thus we have reduced the com-
plexity of the attack in Theorem 10. These results show that even q-bounded
generalised iterated hash functions are not secure, because we can still find mul-
ticollisions in them with the complexity lower than expected from an ideal hash
function. The problem of generalised iterated hash functions that are not q-
bounded is still open.
We should also mention that there does not exist any practical (i.e. not only
theoretical) hash function based on the generalised iterated structure. There are
several reasons for that. First of all, this structure is computationally demanding,
and we usually require hash functions to be fast. Another reason is that the
message must be complete before we can start hashing. In the traditional iterated
structure, we can start hashing as soon as we have the first block of the message,
but in the generalised iterated structure, we need the whole message to determine
the number of blocks. To avoid this problem we can fix the number of blocks, and
then start writing the message. However, in this case the blocks occuring at the
end of the message are not available at the beginning of the hashing. Thus, there
are some restrictions on the sequence α̂, which can potentially result in reduced
security. Last but not least, there arises the problem how to efficiently encode
the (infinite) sequence α̂. When the sequence is q-bounded, the structure is not
secure. When the sequence is not q-bounded, it must have some pattern, which
can also lead to attacks.
The upper bound on N(m, q) presented in Chapter 3 is still probably not
optimal for most of the cases and could be lowered. This would result in even
smaller complexity of the attack. Therefore, the behaviour of N(m, q) could be
the object of further study.
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